Edward Keith Ludahl v. Delmar Larson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Edward Keith Ludahl v. Delmar Larson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Brad Rich; Attorney for Appellant;
Robert Hansen; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ludahl v. Larson, No. 15713 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1189
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD KEITH LUDAHL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
DELMAR LARSON, Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 15713 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying appellant's 
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
presiding. 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
BRAD RICH 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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DELMAR LARSON, Sheriff of Salt 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD KEITH LUDAHL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
DELMAR LARSON, Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, 
Case No. 15713 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, RICHARD KEITH LUDAHL, appeals from dismissal of 
his Writ of Habeas Corpus rendered in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter came on for hearing in front of the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary on the Writ of Habeas Corpus and was dismissed and 
the plaintiff-appellant remanded to the custody of the Sheriff 
for extradition to the State of Oregon. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks dismissal of the Governor's Warrant 
and extradition proceedings against him, or in the alternative, 
reinstatement of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and a new hearing on the 
sufficiency of the Governor's Warrant and extradition proceedings_ 
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ii 
:1 
I 
against him. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 27, 1977, the appellant was arrested on a 
fugitive warrant from the State of Oregon. Fugitive charges were 
filed against him in City Court and the first hearing on that matti 
set for February 25, 1977. On February 25, 1977, the matter was 
continued for an additional 30 days to the 28th day of March, 19l1 
On the 28th day of March, 1977, it was a]:._~~ged that a 
Governor's Warrant had arrived and the fugitive charges against 
-------- ---
appellant were dismissed and the appellant was arraigned in Distri:: 
--~ 
Court on the Governor's _Warrant. At that time the appellant requer 
time for a petition for a Governor's ~earj.~g and/or a Writ of Habea 
Corpus. The Court granted time for that and set bond in the matter 
--
and the appellant was release~. 
On May 18, 1977, a Governor's Hearing was had and subseque: 
the Governor, having taken the matter under advisement, denied the 
appellant's petition for refusal of extradition by the Governor. 
---- - The Governor's Hearing having failed, the app~llant filed 
a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Cor~'!s on November 18, 1977. That 
petition came on for hearing before the Honorable Peter F. Leary 
on February 2, 1978. 
On that occasion appellant contended that the docume?ts 
supporting the Governor's Warrant were inadequate in that they fai'.: 
to ~i~de an affidavit as required by Chapter 56 and Title 17of 
- 2 -
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Ccah Code Ann. The Court heard argument on the matter and denied 
:he Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered that the 
appellant be taken back into custody and extradi.!=ed by to the State 
of Oregon. 
The appellant was surrendered at that point and was, within 
the next few days, returned to the State of Oregon. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS IN THAT THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED WERE 
NOT SUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §77-56-3. 
The provisions for proceeding in an extradition matter are 
set forth in Chapter 56 of Title 77 of Utah Code Ann. The only 
remedy provided for the test of a Governor's Warrant under that 
chapter is set forth in §77-56-10. That section provides that: 
If the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he 
or they desire to test the legality of his arrest 
the judge of such court of record shall fix a 
reasonable time to be allowed him within which to 
apply for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
In the case of Little v. Beckstead, 358 P.2d 93 (1961) at 
94, this court said that the plaintiff should be allowed to test 
the validity of the extradition proceedings and challenge whether 
the statutory requirements had been met. In Mora v. Larson, 540 P. 2d 
520 (1975) at 521, this court held that: 
· .. in extradition proceedings the governor's 
rendition warrant makes a prima facie case and shi~t~ 
the burden to the petitioner to show that he is no_t 
tbe person named therein. 
- 3 -
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It has been generally held that a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
may attack the extradition proceeding on three substantive groun: 
First, that he is not the same person that the demanding state 
wants. Second, that he was not in the state at the time that the 
state alleges that he was in that state. Third, that the crime f:: 
which the state is attempting to extradite is not a crime in that 
demandi~~ s~te. In addition to the substantive grounds the 
petitioner may attack by way of Writ of Habeas Corpus, the procedu: 
inadequacies of the extradition proceeding. This court has said 
in Little v. Beckstead, supra, at page 94: 
The proper process for testing the legal sufficiency 
and validity of plaintiff's arrest and detention 
is the habeas corpus proceeding. It is statutory 
in Utah that persons arrested upon a Governor's 
Warrant for extradition shall be given the 
opportunity to apply for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
to test the legality of the arrest. Plaintiff 
should have been allowed to test the validity of 
the extradition proceeding and challenge whether 
the statutory requirements had been met. 
In that same case, the court, however, §!S_ta,blished that it was in 
-----
fact a valid concern for the trial court to examine and test the 
-------·---------
sufficiency of the documents that had been submitted by the demand-
----··--ing state. 
In the case at bar, the appellant sought to do just that 
In the case of Birmingham v. Larson, 490 P.2d 893 (1971), Justice 
Ellett's writing for a unanimous court says at page 494: 
Our statute sets out the requirements for the issu-
ance of the governor's rendition warrant. Those 
requirements in substance are: 
- 4 -
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(1) A written request from the executive of the 
demanding state alleging (a) that the accused 
was present in the demanding state at the time 
of the corrrrnission of the alleged offense, and 
that (b) thereafter he fled the state. 
(2) A copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate 
of the demanding state with a copy of any warrant 
which was issued thereon, together with 
(3) A statement by the executive authority of 
the demanding state that the person claimed 
has (a) escaped from confinement, or (b) broken 
the terms of his bail, probation or parole. 
It is the contention of the appellant that nothing in the 
documents submitted to the trial court constituted an appropriate 
affidavit made before the magistrate of the demanding state as 
required by subsection (2) quoted from Birmingham v. Larson, supra. 
There is amongst those documents filed with the court a statement 
of the crime which 1 is ts the charge but is not signed ,gnci not swo~n 
to. It is apparently the basis for the Governor's Rendition Warrant. 
The appellant contended before the trial court that that was insuffi-
cient in that it was in no way an affidavit as required by the 
statute by §77-56-3 and as set for in Birmingham v. Larson, supra, 
and that therefore the documentations submitted by the State of 
Oregon was insufficient to allow the extradition of the appellant. 
Based upon this failure of the documentation required, 
the appellant feels that a dismissal of the extradition proceeding 
against him is appropriate. 
- 5 -
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS 
RIGHT TO APPEAL BY VIRTUE OF THE COURT'S ORDER THAT 
HE BE IMMEDIATELY EXTRADITED TO THE STATE OF OREGON 
AND BY THE SUBSEQUENT TAKING OF THE APPELLANT 
PRIOR TO THE APPEAL PERIOD LAPSING. 
The appellant in this case was appointed counsel because 
he was found by the court to be indigent. In connection with the 
filing of a Writ of Habeas Corpus the appellant filed an Affidavit 
of Impecuniosity verifying his continued indigency. At the time 
of the taking of his appeal he was incarcerated, first at the Salt 
Lake County Jail and then in Oregon, he was unemployed and had no 
source of income. 
Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (c) provides 
that a bond on appeal is required in all cases but if the appellant 
is indigent, he may file an affidavit as set out in Utah Code Ann 
§21-7-3 (1953). Such an affidavit will waive the bond on appeal. 
The Affidavit of Impecuniosity meets the requirements set out in 
Utah Code Ann. §21-7-3 (1953) and no bond on appeal is required. 
However, Rule 73 (d) sets forth the conditions for obtaini: 
-
a stay of judgment pending an appeal. That r~]:_~_ P!Ovid_e~ th<?_tif 
the appellant desires a stay of judgment during the pendency of the 
-------------·~------....... -··--
appeal, he must file. ~--~\.lperse~eas in an amount set by the court . 
...__.--·---- -
That section does not provide for the indigent appellant. From 
those two sections it is clear that while the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure make allowances for the indigent appellant in that they 
waive the cost of the bond on appeal. They do not provide any 
- 6 -
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mechanism whereby the indigent defendant can obtain a stay judgment 
during the pendency of that appeal. 
The the conclusion of the trial court hearing after the 
court had denied the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (T. 78) 
and after the court had ordered him returned to Oregon (T. 78) the 
counsel for the appellant asked for a stay of even a few minutes in 
order to discuss with the appellant the possibility of an appeal 
and was denied a stay of execution on the sentence for even that 
long. Faced with that difficulty there was no way for the appellant, 
being indigent, to prevent the State of Oregon from coming to take 
him immediately. Oregon got him wi thip ten da_ys and the appeal 
was filed at the direction of the appellant from his incarceration 
in the State of Oregon. 
It is the appellant's contention that he was denied his 
constitutional rights in that he was taken from this state without 
benefit of appeal, and secondly, that he was prevented from staying 
---~ ~-..-.~.·- ·-~.... -· --..:,.~ 
the judgment of the court because he was in fact not able to .. ~t 
a supersedeas bond and therefore, by virtue of his poverty, deprived 
of rights that he would otherwise had been able to purchase. In 
the case of Washington v. Renouf, 299 P. 2d 620 (1956), this court 
held that the state's power to try a person accused of a crime is 
not impaired by the fact that he was brought within the territorial 
jurisdiction by illegal means. The implication of this in an 
extradition proceeding is that if a person is deprived of his rights 
md removed illegally and in violation of the provisions of Title 77, 
- 7 -
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Chapter 56 to the demanding state then he, as a practical matter, 
has no remedy. 
In the case before the court, this is precisely what has 
happened. The appellant has no way to prevent his being removed 
from the state before he has had an opportunity to fully litigate 
his matters in court. Perhaps this is an explanation for the 
paucity of extradition cases of first impression that had been 
before this court. 
CONCLUSION 
Towards that end the appellant asks simply that ~e be 
• 
·' granted a dismissal of the extradition and that the case be dis-
missed, or in the alternative, remanded to the District Court. 
While this has no direct effect and is not binding on the State of 
Oregon, appellant submits that legal proceedings there will be able 
to take into consideration the court's holding in this case, and 
take appropriate action. 
G;t~Qj 
BRAD RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 8 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
